From the Washington Chronicle of February 20, 1864

REPORT UPON THE JAMES ISLAND AFFAIR
of June 16th, 1862
BY
COLONEL JOSEPH HOLT
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, U.S.A.

It will be recollected that some twenty months since, in July, 1862, while General Hunter commanded the Department of the South and General Benham the district now under Colonel Gillmore, an expedition was planned against Charleston, which landed at James Island.

Within a few days after this landing General Hunter returned to Hilton Head, leaving General Benham in command, with directions to :secure" his encampment, but not to advance on Charleston. As these encampments were covered by the fire of a rebel battery at Seccesionville, General Benham deamed it indispencsable for holding his position, (and to be entirely justified by the order of General Hunter) to attempt to reduce this battery. He therefore directed the assault upon the morning of the 16th of June.

This attack was ordered to be made at the earliest daylight, but did not actually take place til after sunrise; and to this delay General Benham attributed the repulse which followed.

General Hunter, however, dissatisfied with the loss which had occured, arrested General Benham, and sent him out of the department, though, as he repeatedly stated, and as was the fact, without preferring and charges against him. But it is presumed that the fact of this arrest, with the newspaper comments and other publications of those ignorant of the circumstances, were the cause, that, after a few weeks, general Benham's appointment as a General of Volunteers was revoked, and he was returned to his duties as a field officer of engineers, though there was no trial or even notice given him of any charges.

After some five or six months -- in January, 1863 -- the President was induced to direct an examination of the case by Colonel Holt, the Judge Advocate

General of the Army. The result was a most cpmlete exhoneration of General Benham from all blame in relation to that affair, and the immediate restoration to his rank, and his assignment to the command of the engineer brigade in the Army of the Potomac, on which duty he has continued since that time.

As this report, however, was not given to the public, and General Benham has himself abstained from publishing any account of the affair, the assumed histories of this action --- by Headly Abbot, and others -- made up apparently from the newspaper statements of the time, have done such great injustice to General Benham, that when the President's attention was called to them, he at once authorized the publication of Colonel Holt's report, herewith placed before the public, to the complete vindication of that officer; showing, as it fully does, that this assault appeared most fully justified by the orders of General Hunter, that it was a "military necessity," was well planned and that "it failed from no faults of General Benham."

Before proceeding to this report it may be well to exemplify "the truth of history" as we find it in ?Headly's book, at least, by stating that in two important actions, when General Benham was undeniably the sole commander of the troops engaged, his name has not been mentioned at all, and in a third action it is only named in connection with a statement absolutely incorrect.

At Correck's Ford, where Garnett was killed and his train captured, as General Harris' letters and orders abundantly testify, he commended all the troops engaged, having led the skirmishes in that pursuit and given all the orders in that action, General Morris being several miles in rear, advancing with the main columns.

At Fort Polaski, he commanded all the troops engaged, and was the senior officer who gave any orders at the bombardment being night and day under fire in the batteries, fully as much so as Captain Gillmore himself, who was then Benham's chief engineers, having no higher appointment beyond what had been given him by General Benham's predecessor. Yet, neither in connection with this affair, does General Benham's name appear in Headley.

And at Carnifax Ferry it is stated the Benham, with his brigade, was permitted to "make a bold reconnoissance, nothing more." This is absolutely incorrect. The Commanding General ordered a reconnoissance of one regiment at near 11 o'clock in the morning, and countermended that order in a very few minutes, before the regiment had moved, and about four hours after, he ordered Benham forward on the enemy, and authorised him to "use his discretion," as was published at that time by one who witnessed it, then acting as aid to Commanding General.

At this battle of Carnifax Ferry, General Benham commanded the landing, not to say the only, brigade engaged.

Again as to a fourth affair; The rout of Floyd through Fayette County,Va. about the middle of November, 1861, there Benham commanded, in a pursuit of four or five days, through rain and mud and snow, until ordered to return, and where the rebel accounts, as published in a Richmond paper and reprinted in the New York Herald of december 24, 1861, assert, "it was the most dissrespectful rout that out (their) enemies have suffered during the war," and "made the ill-fated campaign, in Western Virginia, in a blaze of glory for the Yankees." The "History" of Headley makes not the slightest ellusion at all to this rout, or to the commander.

REPORT OF JUDGE ADVOCATE, GENERAL HOLT.

Judge Advacate General's Office, january 26, 1863,

To His Excellency, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States:

Sir: - In compliance with your written direction, under date of ?? instant, I have carefully examined the case of Major Benham, and now have the honor to submit this following report:-

The appointment of Major Benham as brigadier general of volunteers was by your order revoked on the 7th of August last, on the recommondation of Major General Wallock of same date, approved by the Secretary officer. While in command at James Island, South Carolina a short time previously, he had directed an attack on an earthwork near Seccessionville, in which his troops had been repulsed. In a communication addressed to the Secretary of War by Major general Hunter, on the 27th of June, enclosing letters from Brigadier General Wright and Stevens, explanatory of this attack and repulse, is found the following language:--

"You will see from the letter of General Wright and General Stevens, that in a council of war, held on the evening previous to the attack, these officers, together with Colonel Williams, commandingg a brigade, "remonstrated strongly and emphatically with General Benham, and warned him that he was about to fight a battle in violation of orders."

This warning is spoken of in the letter of General Stevens to major general Hunter, on the 8th of July, and is thus refered to:-

"General Wright, moreover, warned general Benham that his orders were, in fact, orders to fight a battle. In this General Williams and myself in express terms concurred."

It will be observed that there is nothing said in this wraning as to any "violation of orders." General Hunter -- an interpretation which could be a total departure from the fact, as we clearly ascertain by recurring to the words of General Stevens.

Upon this emphetic decleration of general Hunter, without, probably examining the letter of General Stevens to see how far it was justified, General Benham's appointment was no doubt revoked. Strange to say, this paragraph in the letter of General Stevens was printed in the New York Times in precisely the sence in which General Hunter had edited it, though in different language. It reads, as published in that journal, thus:--

"General Wright, moreover, warned General Benham that his orders were in fact orders not to fight a battle. In this General Williams and myself, in express terms concurred."

It will be seen that, by the introduction of the word not, the meaning of the sentence was totally changed and revered. This publication having met the eye of General Stevens, he, on the 10th of July, addressed a note to the editor of the New York Times --- the original of which is now before me -- in which he says: " I desire to correct an error, either of the printer or copyist, in my official report to general Hunter. In the copy, as printed in your issue of the 16th instant, it is stated, " General Wright warned General Benham that his orders were in fact orders not to fight a battle." It should read, "General Wright warned General Benham that his orders were in fact orders to fight a battle," meaning thereby, General Benham's own orders to his subordinates in relation to the operations of the morrow, and that a battle must inevitably result from them, and not General Hunter's orders to General Benham which were not a matter brought before the conference." It thus appears that the principel ground on which General Benham was dismissed from the volunteer service was a total misapprehension, and has been completely swept away by the frank and emphetic testimony of General Stevens.

The question still remains to be determined, whether the attack on the earthwork was in fact a violation of general Hunter's order to General Benham. This order, the only one issued on the subject, bears date, "On board U.S. Transport Delaware, Stone River, S.C., June 10, 1863, and is in these words:--

"In leaving the Stone River to return to Hilton Head, I desire, in any arrangement that you may make for the disposition of your forces now in this vicinity, you will make no attempt to advance on Charleston or attack Fort Johnson, until largely reinforced, or until you receive specific instructions from these headquarters to that effect.

"You will, however, provide for a secure entrenched encampment, where your front can be covered by the fire of our gunboats from the Stone on the left, and the creek from ?olly river on the right." A glance at the map which accompanies the papers makes it perfectly clear, in my opinion, that the attempt made to capture the earthwork at Seccessionville was not "an advance on Charleston," distant ten, nor "an attack on Fort Johnson," distant seven miles.

General Benham had located his entrenched encampment so as to meet the conditions of the order, by placing it within the protection of the gunboats from the Stone on the left, and from teh creek of ?olly river on the right. He found, however, that it was covered by the fire of the earthwork at Secessionville, immediately in his front, from which shot and shell were thrown into the camps both of Stevens and Wright. To render his encampment, therefore, in the language of the order, "secure", and, indeed, to enable him to continue its occupation, it was absolutely indispensable that the earthwork should be taken. The enterprise was not deemed difficult, or its success at all doubtful.

It was believed by General Benham then, and is believed by him now, that the movement was not only not a violation of general Hunter's order, but that it was in strict compliance with it, and was indeed, under all circumstances in which he was placed, a military necessity. It must be admitted at least that the order was susceptable of the interpretation he gave it, and for following the sincere conviction of his judgement he should not be summarily dismissed and degraded.

General Hunter has preferred no charges against Benham because of this attack on the earthwork, though it appears from a single expression in one of his letters to the Secretary of War that he regarded the movement as a violation of his order. It must be inferred that it was in opposition to some plan or purpose actually entertained by him; but that it was a violation of any purpose or wish disclosed by him in the order to General Benham can not successfully be maintained.

The question of disobedience of the order mentioned being thus disposed of, it remains to inquire whether the attack itself evidenced such rashness of incapacity as justified the Government in stripping General Benham of his commission. Nothing is found in the record which would warrant an affirmative responce to this inquiry. The earthwork was defended by about six hundred men. General Benham had some fifteen regiments and two batteries with which to assault it, and the knowledge he had that the work was being rapidly strengthened, urged him to prompt action. The plan and all the arrangements for the movement, though bold, appear to have been well ??tured. and justified this confident expectations of a favorable (Whole line missing here on the page)

The impression was made on me, by the general tone of the conversation, that while expressing every desire to further your views to the utmost of their po?er. the three officers above named (General Stevens and Wright and Colonel Williams) were scarcely in favor of that movement. None of them, however, said as much as this, and General Wright did observe that we could take the battery, he thought."

The affidavit of William O'Connor proves that on the night previous to the attack, in reply to a question of General Benham, General Stevens expressed the opinion that they could succeed. Whatever opposition, however, may have been felt or manifested by these officers, General Benham was not bound to yield to it. Military men may, and often should, hear the opinions of their subordinates, but it is their privilege, and at times it becomes their duty, to disregard them. I think I am justified in holding that the attack on the earthwork was not, in fact, and certainly was not intended to be, a violation of orders; nor was it an "ill-digested or criminally rash movement, but one which was made from a sense of duty, which should have succeeded, and which failed from no fault of General Benham, but from causes which he could not control. There is a total absence of that clear proof of culpability which alone would justify the summery proceeding which has been resorted to against him.

General Benham is a soldier by profession. He graduated at West Point in 1837, first in his class, and as an engineer has since adorned the highest walks of military science. he has now given some twenty-five years of his life to his country, and it does seem to be dealing harshly and unjustly to thus strike him down and dishonor him without a trial, even though the critisisms of men, it may be, more cautious than himself, should announce his conduct in moving upon the enemy ill-considered and rash. Over-aggressivness has certainly not been as prevailing a vice in the military service during the present war as to call for such an example as the sudden dismissal of this officer presents. Rashness and over-eagerness to stile the enemy may certainly become culpable and be fraught with disaster but this inaction of military men is often yet more to be deplored.